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Kainginero. 
Don•t cut the trees 
For your meagre harvest 
Of corn and beans 
For your hungry cht1dren. 
Each tree that falls 
Resounds around the planet 
Each red-footed. green-jewelled frog 
Smashed or burned 
Sounds our death knell. 
Each tree that falls 
Crushing airy worlds of bromeliads 
Fragrance of trampled orchids 
Dying bewilderment 
Of sloe-eyed. three-toed sloths 
Writes our epitaph. 
Each tree that falls 
The beating of breasts 
And wailing 
Of our monkey cousins 
At the forest edge 
Warns 
Kainginero 
The ark 1s too sma11 
For you 
Too. 
Let me begin by thanking Professor Sapontzis for 
taking the time to respond to my paper. While 
we disagree on important issues, we agree on the 
value of pursuing this discussion. 
Sapontzis' first two criticisms address differences 
between us regarding the foundation of values. 
He first rejects my claim that the environment 
can have value apart from sentient beings, and 
then the claim that focusing on sentience betrays 
some lingering anthropocentrism. These criticisms 
raise important questions that I cannot adequately 
address in this context. Consequently, the 
following should be understood as constituting 
only a preliminary response to questions that will 
require much more discussion. 
Sapontzis argues that "[s]entient beings are not 
at the center of a consistent and adequate value 
theory because they are more important than non­
sentient beings ..., [but] because it is through their 
relations to sentient beings that things come to 
have value." But why should I accept this? This is 
exactly the point of contention between us, and so 
needs to be defended rather than simply asserted. 
What, after all, is so important about sentience? 
The assumption seems to be that the experience 
of pleasure (or the satisfaction of one's desires) 
has an intrinsic positive value, and the experience 
of pain (or the frustration of one's desires), an 
intrinsic negative value. But it is this claim that 
the environmentalist rejects. If we grant that 
both pleasure and pain can serve some 
frogs, bromeHads, monkeys, kaingineros 
In this game of wealth and greed and power 
There's no space for you anymore 
You are 
The dispossessed of the Earth. DISCUSSION 
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evolutionary or ecological role, we must recognize 
that what advances evolutionary or ecological 
"ends" may not always maximize pleasure (or 
satisfaction) or minimize pain (or frustration). 
We must recognize that what can only be valued 
negatively from the standpoint of the individual 
sentient being can sometimes play a positive role 
with respect to preserving the "integrity, stability 
and beauty of the biotic community." But which 
is the more fundamental of these ends? --that 
which is beneficial to the individual sentient being, 
or to the ecosystem upon which the existence of 
the individual depends? 
This brings us to Sapontzis' first question, but at 
this point I can only suggest an answer. Rather 
than claim that values can exist only in relation to 
sentient beings, I would argue that they can be 
recognized only by sentient beings. But let me 
grant, for this discussion, that values can exist 
only in relation to sentient beings. Sentient 
beings, however, can exist only in relation to the 
ecosystem as a whole. What the environmentalist 
stresses is that the existence of individua1 sentient 
beings is so thoroughly dependent upon the 
interaction and harmony of the entire ecosystem, 
that it is only in abstract thought that we can 
contemplate the existence of individual sentient 
beings apart from the ecosystem of which they 
are part. But if we cannot ultimately distinguish 
between individual sentient beings and the natural 
environment that sustains them, then to claim that 
value exists only in relation to sentient beings is 
to allow that it exists throughout the environment 
as a whole. 
Sapontzis' third point I simply reject: I have no 
qualms in allowing that nature can have a value 
for non-human sentient beings. I simply deny 
that this is the only value it has apart from 
human beings. And I have no problem in 
admitting that humans value nature for a variety 
of reasons. As to Sapontzis' final point, I would 
argue that the environmentalist position is itself 
"arrogant" or "paternalistic" only if all moral 
criticism involves these attitudes--a view I do not 
accept. What is arrogant is not the claim that 
certain parts of the natural order merit moral 
condemnation, but rather that there is something 
morally amiss in the very fabric of the natural 
world. My claim has been that we should not 
assume that we have something to teach the 
natural world about morality, but rather that we 
may have something to learn from it. 
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